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Opis

Based on the policy-making structures of Venezuelan government, this book examines the constitutionally allocated powers of the executive and legislature and shows how the powers of each branch are exercised given the incentives established by the electoral system and changing partisan strengths. Several institutional characteristics have led to a passive legislature and an activist chief executive. The advantages presidents enjoy as a result of their constitutional and partisan powers are demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evidence, including records of votes of censure, initiation of legislation, and the use of decree authority. Because of its dominance, the Venezuelan executive branch is the focus of interest-group pressure, which is institutionalized through consultative commissions and a decentralized public administration. The author analyzes memberships of more than 300 advisory commissions and governing boards, revealing the preponderance of posts filled by umbrella agencies for business and labor. The interaction of this limited version of civil society with policy makers in the executive branch has led to a highly protectionist development strategy and excessive government subsidies. The strategy and the political process that made it possible were both exhausted by the end of the 1980s. Venezuela was in political and economic crisis.

Szczegóły książki

Kategoria Książki po angielsku Society & social sciences Politics & government Political structure & processes

• Pełny tytuł: Democratic Institutional Design
• Podtytuł: The Powers and Incentives of Venezuelan Politicians and Interest Groups
• Autor: Brian F. Crisp
• Język: Angielski
• Oprawa: Twarda
• Liczba stron: 296
• EAN: 9780804735704
• ISBN: 0804735700
• ID: 04716955
• Wydawca: Stanford University Press
• Waga: 544 g
• Wymiary: 229 × 152 × 24 mm
• Data wydania: 01. June 2000

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