You might also like

More about Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problems under Partial Information

• Book details
• Synopsis
• Trending among others

You get 121 loyalty points

Book synopsis

Moral hazard is a key issue in principal-agent literature. Examples lie in several aspects of real life, such as the worker's lack of effort when his/her conduct cannot be directly observed by the employer, and the principal's consequent need to motivate the agent to work as much as possible in his/her best interests. Another example is the relationship between voters and politicians, where elections serve as a disciplining mechanism to prevent rent-seeking behavior by unobserved public administrators. In this work we analyze such problems in a continuous-time setting with a model specification that draws from the classical consumption/investment ŕ la Merton. Agents differ in competence, which is incompletely (but symmetrically) known by all players and learned over time by observing agent's performance. From a mathematical point of view, the analysis uses classical filtering techniques to re-formulate the problem within a complete information setting; then, relying on the dynamic programming principle and by using a guess-and-verify approach, explicit (at least to some extent) solutions are provided.

Book details

Book category Books in English Economics, finance, business & management Economics

• Full title: Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problems under Partial Information
• Author: Alessandra Mainini
• Language: English
• Binding: Paperback
• Number of pages: 64
• EAN: 9783639371741
• ISBN: 3639371747
• ID: 06843885
• Publisher: VDM Verlag
• Weight: 104 g
• Dimensions: 229 × 152 × 4 mm
• Date of publishing: 02. August 2011

Trending among others

---

---

---